Aleksandra Mężykowska
Réka FriederyThe Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 triggered the largest forced migration in Europe since World War II. Millions of Ukrainians crossed international borders in search of safety, with the four Visegrad countries — Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia — situated on the front line of this displacement. In contrast to the 2015 migration crisis, which was characterised by arrivals from the Middle East and North Africa largely bypassing Central Europe, the present crisis has had a direct impact on the V4 region from both a demographic and a political perspective. The General Report, produced under the Visegrad Grant project, examines how these four countries responded legally, institutionally and practically to the unprecedented arrival of Ukrainian refugees.
1. Pre-War Migration and Demographic Context
Before 2022, the V4 countries were relatively homogeneous, with strong national majorities and comparatively small foreign populations. Yet across all four countries, Ukrainians were both officially recognized minorities and the largest migrant group. This dual status positioned them as both historically rooted communities and mobile economic migrants. In all four states, Ukrainians filled labor market gaps, often in construction, agriculture, and care sectors. Their presence had already created cultural familiarity and policy precedents that shaped how governments approached the 2022 refugee influx. The pre-war prominence of Ukrainians explains why the V4 countries—unlike during the 2015 migration wave—responded with openness. Ukrainians were not perceived as culturally distant outsiders but rather as close neighbours, kin communities, or economic partners. This highlights how migration governance is filtered through identity politics, where cultural proximity can dramatically shape legal hospitality.
2. Emergency Legal Frameworks
The mass influx prompted divergent emergency responses. These varied approaches reveal constitutional path dependency. Countries with strong executive traditions (Hungary, Czechia) resorted to formal states of emergency, while Poland relied on fast-track legislation and Slovakia used statutory modifications.
3. Temporary Protection and Legal Status
The EU activated the Temporary Protection Directive for the first time on 4 March 2022. Yet implementation varied. The temporary nature of TP clashed with the long-term realities of displacement. Poland’s innovative residence permits addressed this, while Czechia’s restrictive stance reflected political calculations about encouraging return migration. The fragmented approaches underscore the EU’s structural weakness: even under a harmonized directive, national discretion produced divergent refugee experiences.
4. Institutional Coordination and Practical Measures
All V4 countries applied humanitarian exemptions under the Schengen Borders Code, allowing entry without full documentation. Poland and Slovakia managed massive crossings (17 million and 2.1 million in 2022, respectively), while Czechia had no direct border with Ukraine. COVID-19 restrictions were quickly lifted or waived. Institutional readiness varied sharply. Poland’s prior experience with Ukrainian migration allowed rapid adaptation, while Slovakia’s delayed planning exposed structural weaknesses. Hungary’s reliance on executive decrees ensured efficiency but at democratic cost. The key lesson: contingency planning matters, but so does institutional culture—centralized, flexible structures adapt faster than fragmented, ad hoc ones.
5. Sectoral Rights and Access
Employment: Poland and Czechia maximized labour integration, reducing informality. Hungary’s occupational segmentation risked underutilizing skills. Slovakia lagged in enabling entrepreneurship.
Social Assistance: Poland and Slovakia adopted the most inclusive models. Czechia and Hungary restricted benefits, reflecting fiscal caution and integration scepticism.
Health Care: Poland’s health inclusion was exemplary but strained capacities. Czechia’s retrenchment illustrates fiscal and political pressures after initial solidarity.
Education: Education integration lagged across all countries, hindered by capacity, language, and dual-system dilemmas. Poland’s delay in compulsory schooling allowed educational gaps to widen.
Conclusion
The Russian invasion of Ukraine forced the Visegrad countries into an unprecedented role as humanitarian hosts. They responded with extraordinary measures that, while uneven, collectively demonstrated resilience and solidarity. The broader lesson is that migration crises test not only legal systems but political cultures. The openness toward Ukrainians contrasted sharply with resistance to non-European asylum seekers in 2015, underscoring the selective nature of solidarity. Yet even selective solidarity matters: it produced legal innovations, welfare inclusions, and governance reforms that may outlast this crisis. Whether the V4 “passed” the stress test depends on perspective. Measured against 2015, the answer is clearly yes: they avoided paralysis and hostility. Measured against the needs of long-term integration and EU harmonization, the answer is more cautious: progress was uneven, temporary, and fragile. Yet the reliance on temporary frameworks, lack of harmonization, and political instrumentalization of emergencies show the limits of the V4’s preparedness. As the war continues, the sustainability of these measures will determine whether the V4 can transform crisis-driven responses into stable migration governance. The experience offers valuable lessons for Europe as a whole: that solidarity, preparedness, and inclusivity are not luxuries but necessities when confronting displacement on this scale.
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The research was co-funded by the governments of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia through the International Visegrad Fund under the Visegrad project No. 22320067. The Fund’s mission is to promote sustainable regional cooperation in Central Europe. The participants were Aleksandra Mężykowska, Anna Młynarska-Sobaczewska and Piotr Polak ILS PAS, Věra Honusková, Charles University, Réka Friedery, ELTE CSC ILS, Miroslava Mittelmannová, Trnava University/the Human Rights League (Slovakia), Lukáš Novák, the Human Rights League (Slovakia).
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Az írás a szerzők véleményét tartalmazza, és nem értelmezhető a TK hivatalos állásfoglalásaként.