Drawing on the works on comparative constitutional change and the Hungarian and Polish experiences from 1990, we argue that, even in illiberal constitutionalism, informal constitutional amendments agreed by the constituted powers lead to a legitimate and even desirable change to the constitutional system – from the perspective of the actual illiberal regime. It is proposed in this paper that this process is informed by illiberalism. More actors are involved in the formation of informal constitutional amendment as compared to the previous liberal era. The leading role of the political branch, as the engine of the informal change, increases, which also alters the role of constitutional courts. These courts are used, impliedly instructed or they just instinctively contribute to the preparation, making and justifying illiberal constitutional changes. The content of the result of this process detaches itself from the minimum standards of substantive constitutional democracy. 

Hybrid format: at the Institute for Legal Studies (Tóth Kálmán utca 4, 1097 Budapest, T.0.25.) and online. 

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